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CASE NOTES
COMMERCIAL PAPER-Uniform Commercial Code-Liability of Payor Banks
For Checks Retained Beyond the Midnight Deadline. American National
Bank of Powell v. Foodbasket, 497 P.2d 546 (Wyo. 1972).

Plaintiff Foodbasket had authorized Pat McPherson,
their bookkeeper and office girl, to endorse checks and make
deposits in their account in the First National Bank of Powell.
Pat McPherson prepared deposits which included two checks
payable to Foodbasket and drawn by Pat McPherson on defendant American National Bank. She endorsed both checks
on behalf of Foodbasket. At no time did she have sufficient
funds in her account to cover the checks. The checks were
written to her employer a few days after she gave notice she
was leaving her job, and the apparent purpose of the checks
was to cover up some sort of fraud. On the same day she deposited the second check, she telephoned the vice-president of
American National advising him she had written the checks
which would be coming to the bank and requesting a loan to
cover them. The vice-president responded that American
National could not make the loan. The two checks were delivered by First National Bank to American National Bank
on September 8, and American National returned the checks
on September 11. The amounts of the checks were charged
back by First National to Foodbasket. Foodbasket brought
suit alleging that American National was liable by virtue of
Wyoming Statutes, Section 34-4-302 because the checks were
held beyond the midnight deadline. Defendant American
National contended that Foodbasket had no reason to expect
or right to require the checks to be accepted or paid. Summary judgment was issued in district court for Foodbasket
in the amount of $8,400. The Supreme Court held that absent
a valid defense American National would have been accountable for its failure to meet the midnight deadline. But American National had a valid defense since notice of dishonor was
given to Pat McPherson as agent of Foodbasket and that
notice was imputed to Foodbasket, excusing American National from liability for late dishonor.1
1. American Nat'l Bank of Powell v. Foodbasket, 497 P.2d 546 (Wyo. 1972).
Copyright@ 1973 by the University of Wyoming
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Because Foodbasket based its cause of action solely on
Wyoming statutes, Section 34-4-302, the court's consideration
was limited to liability under that statute. Other considerations which would normally be relevant to determining the
liability of payor banks were omitted.' The Foodbasket case,
therefore, affords an excellent opportunity to consider the
liability of payor banks under 34-4-302 as interpreted in
Wyoming.
34-4-302 is one of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code8 having been numbered in the original Code as
4-302. It provides as follows:
In the absence of a valid defense such as breach of a
presentment warranty (subsection (1) of section 344-207), a settlement affected or the like, if any item
is presented on and received by a payor bank, the
bank is accountable of the amount of (a) a demand
item other than a documentary draft whether properly payable or not if the bank, in any case where
it is not also a depository bank, does not pay or return the item or send notice of dishonor until after
its midnight deadline; or (b) any other properly payable item unless within the time allowed for acceptance of payment of that item the bank either accepts
or pays the item or returns it and accompanying
documents."
The official comments annotated in the Code provide
little explanation of 4-302, merely stating that "4-302 states
the rights of the customer if the payor bank fails to take the
action required within the time limits prescribed. "5 A "payor
bank" is defined as "a bank by which an item is payable as
drawn or accepted. ' The midnight deadline is midnight on
the next banking day on which a bank receives the item.' Beyond the terse official comment and the definitions in other
2. For a general discussion of liability of payor banks under the Uniform Commercial Code see Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 330 (1965); Bunn, Bank Collections
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1964 Wise. L. REv. 278 (1964).
3. Wyo. STAT. § 43-1-101 to 10-105 (Supp. 1971).
4. Wyo. STAT. § 34-4-302 (Supp. 1971).
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-302, Comment 1.
6. WYo. STAT. § 34-4-105 (Supp. 1971).
7. Wyo. STAT. § 34-4-104(h) (Supp. 1971).
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sections, the meaning of 4-302 is open to judicial interpretation.
Although 4-302 was interpreted for the first time by the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Foodbasket, it had already been
interpreted in other jurisdictions. The first case to interpret
the provision and the case which most courts appear to follow
is Rock Island Auction Incorporated v. Empire Parking
Company.! Rock Island concerned a bank that held an insufficient funds check beyond the midnight deadline in the belief that the maker would soon deposit funds sufficient to
cover the check.
The defendant bank in Rock Island argued that 4-302
meant that it must only "account" for the check and that the
amount for which it was liable was controlled by 4-103(5).'
The court, however, held that "accountable" in 4-302 is the
amount of the demand item which was held beyond the midnight deadline.
The defendant bank's other argument in Rock Island was
that 4-302, by placing a more stringent liability upon payor
banks, was a denial of due process and, hence, unconstitutional. The court found 4-302 constitutional, reasoning that
since the role of payor banks was crucial to the collection
process, the distinction made between payor and depository
banks was not arbitrary or irrational.
Other cases since Rock Island have consistently followed
it, at times adding detail to its basic holding. In National
City Bank of Rome v. Motor Contract Company of Rome ° the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that customary practice had
no bearing on the application of 4-302 because the legislature,
in adopting the use of the midnight deadline, had established
its own mandatory standard. In Exchange Bank and Trust
Company v. Pure Ice and Cold Storage Company" the Su8. 32 Ill.
2d 269, 204 N.E.2d 721 (1965).
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103(5) provides: "The measure of damages
for failure to exercise ordinary care in handling an item is the amount of
the item reduced by the amount which could not have been realized by the
use of ordinary care, and where there is bad faith it includes other damages,
if any, suffered by the party as a proximate consequence."
10. 112 Ga. App. 268, 166 S.E.2d 742 (1969).
11. 415 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1967).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1973

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 8 [1973], Iss. 1, Art. 11
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VIII

preme Court of Texas ruled that although 4-302 gave rise to
a cause of action, a plaintiff could not recover when he had
waited over two years before electing to hold the drawee
liable. Farmers'CooperativeLivestock Market Inc. v. Second
National Bank of London 2 determined that a check is a "demand item" within the meaning of 4-302.
In several of the cases the defendant argued that where
the account in the drawee bank contained insufficient funds,
the plaintiff was left in no worse position due to the delayed
return of the check since even if the check had been returned
promptly, it would not have been paid. The courts consistently held that whether the maker had sufficient funds in
the drawee bank or whether the check was otherwise properly
payable were not relevant factors when liability was based
upon 4-302(a)."
The effect of all of these decisions is to create a uniform
interpretation that 4-302 requires payor banks who retain
checks beyond the midnight deadline to pay the checks. Payment is required in the "absence of a valid defense" under the
Code.
In Foodbasket the Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged that American National would be liable under the
standard interpretation of 4-302" but found that the bank had
presented a valid defense. From the language used by the
court, it would seem the uniform interpretation developed by
other courts had been adopted in Wyoming. However, a close
examination of the "valid defense" accepted by the court
indicates that the result in Foodbasket is in conflict with the
majority view of 4-302.
The defense recognized by the court is that when Pat
McPherson telephoned the vice-president of American National and was informed American National would not grant
12. 427 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. App. 1968).
13. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Security Pacific Nat'l
Bank, 23 Cal. App. 3rd 638, 100 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1972). See also cases cited
supra notes 8 and 12.
14. "Thus while we agree that, under various authorities heretofore cited
(footnote 2), absent a valid defense American National would have been
accountable for its failure to meet the midnight deadline . .. ." Supra note 1,
at 548.
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her a loan to cover the checks, she received notice of dishonor.
Such notice of dishonor was imputed from Pat McPherson
to Foodbasket because of the sole actor doctrine. Since Foodbasket had no reason to expect the check would be honored,
American National is excused from further notice by section
34-3-511.""
The major premises of this defense need to be evaluated.
The first conclusion of the court is that when the vice-president of American National told Pat McPherson she would
not receive the loan, that notice of dishonor was given. There
is little detail offered in the case report to indicate the exact
words spoken. All that is known is that a loan to cover the
checks was requested and refused. The UCC provides that
notice of dishonor may be given in any reasonable manner,
whether spoken or written, as long as the person receiving
notice is aware of the identity of the item being dishonored
and that the item is being dishonored. 6 Since Pat McPherson called about the checks, there can be little doubt that she
knew what items were under discussion. It is doubtful, however, that refusing the loan was sufficient to constitute notice
of dishonor. At a minimum, it was an unusual bank procedure.
The court's conclusion that notice to the agent, Pat McPherson, was imputed to the principal, Foodbasket, is also
open to dispute. Foodbasket apparently contended that where
an agent is acting adversely to his principal in his own interest, an exception must be made to the usual rule that notice
to an agent acting within the scope of his authority is notice
to the principal. The court agreed that the exception existed
but countered that in this case there is an exception to the
exception. The exception to the exception which the court
invoked is that where the agent is the sole representative of
a principal in a transaction, knowledge is imputed to the
principal. The court supported its statement of the sole actor
15. Wyo. STAT. § 34-3-511 (Supp. 1971). Subsection (2) (b), relied upon by the
court, provides that notice is excused when the party has no reason to expect the instrument will be paid.
16. WYO. STAT. § 34-3-508(3) (Supp. 1971).
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7 and Great American Inrule with references to Am. Jur.'
demnity Company v. FirstNational Bank of Holdenville.8

Although the existence of the sole actor exception to the
exception is not to be disputed, it is doubtful that the rule was
properly applicable in this situation. A careful examination
of the cases cited by Am. Jur.in support of the rule leads to
the conclusion that the rule applies primarily to agents of
corporations having close identification with the corporation."9 Typically the cases cited involved an agent who was
a stockholder or officers of a corporation in addition to being
an agent."0 The sole actor doctrine is an equitable doctrine
to be applied only in situations where the third party believes
it is dealing with the principal."
The kind of close identification between agent and principal which is the basis of the sole actor doctrine is lacking in
this situation. Pat McPherson was not a corporate officer or
a stockholder or otherwise intimately identified with the
principal. It is unlikely American National felt it was dealing with the principal. The sole actor exception was, therefore, misapplied.
Further doubt concerning the propriety of imputing notice to Foodbasket in this situation arises from the likelihood
that American National knew Pat McPherson would not
convey the notice to her employer. It would seem unreasonable to expect that an employee who has written insufficient
fund checks to her employer for $8,400 would inform her
employer the bank had dishonored the checks. Under the
circumstances, American National probably realized that
some sort of fraud was being perpetrated and could hardly
expect the notice to be conveyed.
The Am. Jur. reference relied upon by the court to support its use of the sole actor doctrine states that when the
17.
18.
19.
20.

3 AM. JuR. 2d Agency § 284 (1962).
100 F.2d 763, 765 (10th Cir. 1988).
See 3 AM. JuR. 2d Agency § 284 nn. 6-8 (1962).
See, e.g., Curtis, Collins and Holbrook Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 215
(1923) (agent was vice president and active manager of corporation);
Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Indian Orchard Mills, 147 Mass. 268, 17 N.E. 496
(1888) (agent was also treasurer of corporation).
21. Pearll v. Selective Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 152, 444 P.2d 443 (1968).
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third party does not "intend or expect that the agent would
communicate" the truth to the principal or where it is known
to the third party that the agent "is acting adversely to the
principal", knowledge should not be imputed.2 2 Reference to
the Restatement of Agency leads to a similar conclusion. The
Restatement rule is that notice is imputed to the principal
even though the agent is acting adversely, except when the
third party is aware of the agent's adverse interest."
The foregoing discussion indicates that notice should not
have been imputed to Foodbasket. Since Foodbasket was
without notice of dishonor, imputed or actual, American
National was not excused by 3-511.24 The subsection of 3-511
relied upon by the court excuses notice only when the other
party has no reason to expect or right to require that the instrument be accepted or paid." The defense which the court
recognized was, therefore, improper.
At this point a word should be said about justice. Since
Pat McPherson was a part-time bookkeeper earning $54 a
week, it is unlikely either party would recover the $8400 from
her. The party losing this suit ends up suffering an unrecoverable loss. Where the court is in effect imposing a loss
on one of two parties, it would seem appropriate to weigh
the equities between them. Of the two, Foodbasket seems the
proper party to bear the loss. American National was inefficient but it was Foodbasket who created the circumstance
under which their agent could perpetrate a fraud. Furthermore, as the court notes, Foodbasket had already been cheated
before the checks were written. The checks were merely an
attempt to hide the fraud.
Even though the equities favor American National, such
considerations should not alter the rules of liability established by 4-302. However laudable the idea of doing justice
in the individual case may be, endeavoring to deliver ad hoc
justice in each case will operate to undermine the purpose
of 4-302 and bring confusion to banking transactions. The
22. 3 AM. JuR. 2d Agency § 286 (1962).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 271 (1957).
24. WYo. STAT. § 34-3-511 (Supp. 1971).
25. Id.at (2) (b).
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purpose of the provisions contained in Article 4 of the UCC,
and 4-302 in particular, is to create a system which ensures
prompt payment to a chain of individuals and institutions
involved in a fluid commercial transaction."6 The typical
situation involves a series of banks each extending credit to
each other.2 7 If payor banks delay too long the rights of
others may be compromised. Often the depositor may be a
seller whose rights will be impaired if he must wait too long
to discover if the check has been paid.2 8 It is sometimes a
practice of depository banks to permit their depositors to
withdraw credit after a fixed time calculated to be sufficient
for the check to have reached the payor bank and notice of dishonor to have been received.2
The dangers inherent in this chain of interdependent
banks and individuals is made more serious by the volume of
such transactions. It has been estimated that the number of
checks processed by American banks is 17 billion annually and
is increasing at a rate of seven per cent a year. 0 Given the
nature of the transactions and the tremendous volume of
transactions, banks must act quickly for their mutual protection and support the imposition of some sort of penalty
upon banks that fail to act promptly."
To the extent that exceptions are made in individual cases
in order to do equity, the system which enforces prompt payment is weakened. Obviously the incentive for prompt payment is reduced when individual banks feel that liability
might not be imposed for delay. Creating defenses not recognized by the Code or misapplying defenses provided by the
Code frustrates the purpose of 4-302.
The decision in Foodbasket appears to have been the result of equitable considerations. It seems that the court has
applied agency law as a device to prevent Foodbasket from
26. Leary, MIARQ. L. Rzv., supra note 2.
27. Leary, Deferred and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collection Prob-

lem, 62 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1949).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Rohner, Posting of Checks: Final Payment and the Four Legals, 23 Bus.
LAW. 1075 (1968).

31. Bunn, supra note 2; Leary, eupra note 27.
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recovering under the Code. In the process of finding against
Foodbasket, the court has misapplied agency law and confused
the meaning of the Code.
The same result might have been reached without interfeting with the uniform views of the liability of payor banks
under 4-302. The court in its reasoning stressed the idea that
if Pat McPherson was authorized to receive and endorse
the checks on behalf of Foodbasket, she also must have been
authorized to receive notice of dishonor. Reversing the court's
logic, it could be argued that she did not have authority to
accept payment for her own defalcations on behalf of Foodbasket. If she was acting outside her scope of authority when
she received the checks, then she could not have received them
for Foodbasket. Foodbasket, never having owned the checks,
could hardly expect to receive notice of dishonor.
Although this approach would not interfere with usual
ideas of what constitutes notice of dishonor, and is more in harmony with other applications of 4-302, it is not the best result.
It does less violence to the language of the Code than the
approach adopted by the court, but it still operates to defeat
the policy of prompt payment and definiteness.
The best approach to this type of case in the long run
appears to be to apply the Code as written and avoid considerations of fairness in the individual case. Under such
an approach, it is possible that some undeserving parties
might receive something in the nature of a windfall. However, the overall effect of applying the Code in such a direct
manner would be to better protect the rights of all in the long
run. The necessity for a standardized procedure of prompt
payment greatly outweighs whatever benefit is derived from
denying an undeserving party a windfall.
CONCLUSION

In Foodbasket the Wyoming court ostensibly accepted
the majority views of 4-302 as requiring payment by payor
banks when checks are retained beyond the midnight deadline. However, the actual decision rendered conflicts with
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1973
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a proper application of 4-302 as interpreted by these cases.
The result of claiming adherence to the majority views while
deviating in actual practice is that the meaning of 4-302 has
been muddied. Whether the court will continue to find defenses to 4-302 when deemed convenient to do so is not known.
If further erosions on the responsibility of payor banks
are tolerated under the guise of valid defenses, banks will inevitably suffer from the resulting uncertainty. On the other
hand, if the court's ostensible acceptance of majority views
of 4-302 is an indication that they will be applied in the future, then the Wyoming view of 4-302 could be aligned with
other jurisdictions as soon as other cases arise under 4-302.
In the interim, doubt will remain. After Foodbasket the general rule is that 4-302 imposes liability for payment upon
payor banks that retain checks beyond the midnight deadline, but it is uncertain under what circumstances the court
will be willing to apply the rule.
PATRICK E. HACKER
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